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Special Issue India Review 
  
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Indian Federalism 
 
Chanchal Kumar Sharma and Wilfried Swenden  
 
1. Introduction: the Dynamics of Centre-State Relations—A Research Agenda  
 
This special issue seeks to improve our understanding of the dynamics of center-state 
relations in contemporary India on the basis of a number of case-studies which largely adopt a 
longitudinal and/or comparative theoretical approach. Three fundamental research questions 
warrant a detailed analysis of the emerging dynamics of federal governance in India: 
 
First, what has been the contribution of Indian style federalism to stabilizing and consolidating  
its developing and multi-ethnic democracy?1  We argue that understanding the role of federalism and 
consociational arrangements in the survival of the world’s largest functioning democracy is critical 
because the voluminous literature on federalism offers limited guidance on how to design and 
implement successful democratic federalism.2 Can a study of Indian federalism add to the long-
running debate and a wide range of contending propositions over the purported empirical 
connection between democratic consolidation in a developing country and levels of ethnic 
fragmentation? 3 Is there an ‘Indian’ model of federalism, and if so, might this model be partly 
                                                          
1 Katharine Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave-
Macmillan, 2007); Harihar Battacharyya, Federalism in Asia. India, Pakistan and Malaysia. (London: Routledge, 
2010); Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations. India and Other Multinational 
Democracies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011) ; Wilfried Swenden, “Centre-State Bargaining 
and Territorial Accommodation: Evidence from India,‘” Swiss Political Science Review, Vol.22, No. 4, (2016). 
491-515 and Varshney, Ashutosh ,  “How has Indian federalism done” in Studies in Indian Politics, Vol. 1, No.1, 
(2013), 43-63.  
2 Mihael Filippov, and Olga Shetsova, “Federalism, Democracy and Democratization” in Arthur Benz and Jorg 
Broschek, eds., Federal Dynamics. Continuity, Change & the Varities of Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 167-184; but Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation. Principles of Design (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
3 Some scholars have argued that democracy cannot be sustained in states with low levels of socio-economic 
development (see Seymour Martin Lipset,  “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy.” American Political Science Review Vol. 53, No.1, (1959), pp. 69-105;  Larry Diamond, 
“Economic Development Reconsidered.” American Behavioral Scientist Vol. 35, No 4-5, (1992)  pp. 450–99) and 
high levels of ethnic fragmentation (see, G. B. Powell,Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and 
Violence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).; or that high levels of economic growth cannot be 
achieved by a developing country which is also democratic (see W Galenson, Labor and Economic Development. 
New York: Wiley-Blackwell 1959 and Samuel P. Huntington, and J. Dominguez. “Political Development.” In F. I. 
Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol 3, Macropolitical Theory (Reading, MA: 
Addision-Wesley, 1975) and has high levels of ethnic fractionalization (see, B. Easterly, and R. Levine. “Africa’s 
Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 12, No 4, 1997, pp 1203–
50 and Alesina, Alberto. et al. . “Fractionalization.” Journal of Economic Growth Vol. 8, No 2, 2003, pp 155–94.). 
In contrast, a different set of authors have argued that ethnic diversity neither increases the risk of democratic 
failure nor reduces economic growth (see, Paul Collier, “Implications of Ethnic Diversity.” Economic Policy, Vol. 
16, No32, (2001), pp 127–66.); and that democratization comes at no discernible cost in terms of economic 
growth (see, D. Rodrik, and R. Wacziarg. “Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes?” 
American Economic Review, Vol.  95, No, 2, 2005, pp.: 50–55). 
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responsible for why India has sustained democracy with low levels of economic development and 
high levels of ethno-linguistic fragmentation?4   
 
Our second research question seeks to explore how the delicate balance between centralization 
and state autonomy is being reconfigured in the context of the ongoing process of economic reforms 
since 1991 and the entrenchment of coalition government at the center since 1996, presaged by the 
breakdown of the one-dominant party system in 1989.  The rise of regional parties to key positions 
in the national governing coalition on the one hand and the increasing salience of states in boosting 
national economic growth while charting their own paths of development on the other, prompts us 
to hypothesize that, in the new politico-economic environment, states have acquired greater 
bargaining power and can determine the outcomes of intergovernmental interactions.   Yet, has this 
really been the case, or does the reality provide a more mixed and nuanced picture? After, all, change 
is often slow to materialize and path-dependent. Changing the formal structure of Indian federalism 
may have been difficult, given that altering the Indian constitution requires super-legislative 
majorities which are harder to mobilize in a fragmented party system than in a one party dominant 
one. Economic liberalization and deregulation have been incremental processes too as they ran into 
occasional resistance from small retailers, agricultural producers or large industrial companies 
which profited for long from the license-permit raj. Furthermore, it is not a foregone conclusion that 
states have benefited uniformly from the ‘pluralization’ of the Indian party system and/or the 
liberalization of the economy. Some states may have not gained (much) representation in the central 
government in the era of coalition government whereas relatively resource-poor and 
underdeveloped states may have seen a reduction in intergovernmental solidarity payments whilst 
facing stringent financial rules to satisfy international credit markets. 
 
Our third inquiry attempts to situate the debate on the impact of market transition and 
democratic expansion on the internal workings of Indian federalism in the new political context 
when, for the first time since 1989, one party has managed to capture an overall majority at the 
center. Indeed, the Hindu nationalist BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) gained an overall parliamentary 
majority in the 2014 general elections with about 31 percent of the polity-wide vote. Although the 
party seeks to unite the Indian electorate around the majoritarian notion of a Hindu nation, its 
combative Prime Minister and former Chief Minister Narendra Modi has been touting the idea of 
cooperative federalism. Our special issue provides a first cautious assessment of the institutional and 
policy shifts that have occurred since 2014, and seeks to explain how the return of one-party majority 
government has had at once a centralizing (in political terms) and decentralizing (in economic terms) 
effect on the functioning of the Indian multi-level polity. To what extent does an ideological 
commitment towards a majoritarian strong Indian state undermine the seemingly contradictory 
commitment towards a more co-operative and decentralized federation?  
 
To consider the dynamics of centre-state relations in this new party political and economic 
environment, this special issue proposes a set of thoroughly executed and theoretically grounded 
case studies of Indian federalism along various dimensions such as federal institutions, territorial 
finance, intergovernmental interactions, public policy, state and nation-building and ethnic conflict 
                                                          
 
4 Atul Kohli points out that “the success of democracy in India defies many prevailing theories that stipulate 
preconditions for democracy…Indian democracy is thus best understood by focusing, not mainly on its socio-
economic determinants, but on how power distribution in that society is negotiated and renegotiated.” (Atul 
Kohli, The Success of India’s Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001) p. 1. 
3 
 
regulation. We opt for case-studies, because federalism is much about context.5  Therefore, case 
studies of various dimensions of federal practice in India can yield better results than cross-country 
statistical comparisons. Furthermore, we recognize that party system change and liberalization were 
not sudden developments. For instance, state elections had thrown up durable alternative options to 
Congress much earlier than 1996, whereas a pro-liberal discourse had been gradually gaining 
strength since 1975 and it was Rajiv Gandhi’s bold liberalization attempt in 1985 that led to a 
considerable expansion of pro-liberal constituencies.6 Therefore, although our focus is on the period 
since 1996, the meaning of ‘continuity and change’ in this period cannot be properly understood 
without harking back to the period before. Indeed, institutions typically do not change rapidly; they 
are “sticky, resistant to change, and generally only change in “path-dependent” ways”7 Furthermore 
paradigmatic changes (party system change and liberalization) may not necessarily be linked to 
critical junctures alone, but are often preceded by processes of more incremental or gradual change.8   
 
2. Multiple Dimensions of India's Federal Landscape: An Overview of the Contributions  
 
As alluded to above, the dynamics of Indian federalism underwent significant change in the past 
two decades due to the transformation of the Indian party system and economic liberalization. This 
section provides an overview of the major issues. The first of these, ‘the pluralization of the party 
system’ is not explained as such, but the various contributors to this special issue reflect on its 
implications for the dynamics of center-state relations in India.  
 
Pluralization of the Party System 
 
The significance of the party system for understanding the dynamics of federalism was 
emphasized a long time ago by William Riker. For Riker the structure of political parties (by which 
he meant the extent to which a party system is nationalized or decentralized) parallels the structure 
of federalism and ‘one can measure federalism by measuring parties’ (or rather its party system). 
When parties are fully centralized, so is federalism. When parties are somewhat decentralized, 
federalism is only partially centralized.9 India’s party system has undergone significant change, 
initially with the rise of state-based or non-polity-wide parties playing a more significant role in state 
politics; but especially since 1996 also with a more durable role in national politics, given that all 
                                                          
5 George Anderson,  Federalism: An Introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) and Jan Erk, and 
Lawrence, Anderson, ‘The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic 
Divisions’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2009) 191-202 
6 Chanchal Kumar Sharma, “A Discursive Dominance Theory of Economic Reform Sustainability: The Case of 
India.” India Review, Vol 10, No 2, pp. 126–84 
7 John L. Campbell,  “Institutional Reproduction and Change.” in G. Morgan, ed. The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Institutional Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp 87–116. 
8 James Mahoney, J., and Kathleen . A. Thelen. 2010. “Theory of Gradual Institutional Change.” In James Mahoney 
and Kathleen. A. Thelen, eds.,  Explaining Institutional Change - Ambiguity, Agency and Power, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp 1–37. 
9 William H. Riker,  “Federalism,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. eds., The Handbook of Political Science, 
Volume V, Government Institutions and Processes, eds. (Reading, MA: Addision Wesley, 1975), p. 137.  
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federal governments between 1996 and 2014 were (minority) coalition governments10, in which 
some state or non-polity-wide-parties played their part. Although the BJP has an overall majority in 
the federal parliament since May 2014, it would not have been able to command this status without 
pre-electoral seat-sharing arrangements with at least some of the state parties, a few of which were 
awarded ministerial seats in return.   
 
Scholars have focused extensively on what triggered the transformation of the Indian party 
system from a one party dominant system into a fragmented multi-level party system. In part, they 
point at the gradual de-institutionalization of the Congress party and its inability to attract support 
across a wide range of social groups.11 However, the demise of the one dominant party system is not 
the result of Congress’s de-institutionalization alone. States displaying strong sub-national identities 
(such as Tamil Nadu, the North Eastern states, Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab for instance) featured 
state-specific parties even before India gained independence. Following independence, universal 
suffrage, growing literacy and agricultural advances eventually led to the upliftment of lower caste 
groups who demanded direct political representation through the creation of specific lower caste 
parties, often with a state-specific base instead. They no longer accepted the ‘tokenist’ approach 
which characterized much of Nehru’s India. The churning of lower caste groups also triggered a rise 
of Hindu nationalism (largely led by upper-caste groups); fueling the growth of the BJP12  
 
What has been understood much less clearly is how these party systemic changes have been 
linked with federalism. If one can ‘measure federalism’ by measuring ‘India’s party system’, as Riker 
suggests, then surely Indian federalism should have become much more decentralized as a result of 
the fragmentation of its party system.13 Although India purposefully adopted what Jennings called “a 
federation with strong centralizing tendencies”14 and functioned as a highly centralized federation 
for approximately four decades, with the rise of regional or state parties, and eventually, their entry 
into central coalition government one would expect the Indian state to have moved into a more 
decentralized direction. The various contributions to this special issue show that the pluralization of 
the Indian party system did not necessarily produce a decentralization of the Indian state in a formal 
sense: constitutional amendments to this effect became harder to implement in a context of federal 
coalition government in which the key polity-wide party (Congress or the BJP) did not endorse a 
more federalized constitutional set-up or the state-based parties expressed different regional 
priorities, reflecting their distinctive electoral base and resource strength. However, traces of the 
decentralization of the Indian polity in practice can be found, for instance, in the less frequent use of 
                                                          
10 E. Sridharan,  “The Party System,” in Niraja Gopal Jayal and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, eds., Oxford Companion to 
Politics in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp 117–35;  E. Sridharan, .. “Why Are Multi-Party 
Minority Governments Viable in India? Theory and Comparison.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Vol. 
50, No3, (2012), pp. 314–43. 
11 B.D. Dua,  “Federalism or Patrimonialism: The Making and Unmaking of Chief Ministers in India.” Asian Survey 
Vol 25, No8, (1995), pp: 793–804; Sudipta Kaviraj, “Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics,” Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol.21, No38-39, (1986), pp 1697–1708; Stanley Kochanek, “Mrs. Gandhi’s Pyramid: The New 
Congress,” in H.C. Hart, ed., Indira Gandhi’s India, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976) 
12 Mahendra P. Singh and Douglas. Verney. “Challenges to India’s Centralized Parliamentary 
Federalism.”Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol.  33, No 4, pp. :1-20. 
13 Lawrence Saez, “The 1999 General Elections in India.” Electoral Studies, vol. 20, No1, (2001), pp. 164–69. 
14 Ivor Jennings, Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953) 
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President’s Rule, the rising scope for policy divergence in welfare policy, the assertion of some Chief 
Ministers in para-diplomacy or the diminishing impact of discretionary grants in the total pool of 
grants to the states. The lack of a more solid or formalized basis for decentralization in India implied 
that some of these decentralizing tendencies can be undone more easily following the return of 
majority government in 2014.  
 
  
 
Political Economy Insights into Intergovernmental Interactions 
 
Decentralized spending with centralized financing through grants, from a public finance 
perspective, serves to help central governments implement redistributive programmes. The 
presumption in this perspective is that governments act in their constituents' interests. However, 
from a public choice perspective, government is a self-interested, Leviathan-like entity, and 
intergovernmental grants create perverse incentives for governments to increase their size beyond 
the necessary, producing wastage. A plethora of empirical literature reveals that the party in power 
allocates grants not (only) to maximize welfare gains, but (also and sometimes especially) to 
maximize partisan gains. The empirical contribution by Chanchal Kumar Sharma can be situated 
within this strand of literature.  
He demonstrates how party system change has influenced the distribution of discretionary 
grants from the center to the states. Here we see a notable change in center-state dynamics over time, 
even if there was very little change in the formal constitutional framework on the basis of which the 
center has gained authority to disperse such grants. Based on sophisticated multi-level regression 
models Sharma finds that under Congress party dominance (1972-1989), states ruled by Congress’ 
Chief Ministers received 44 percent higher shares of total discretionary grants and 37 percent higher 
shares of centrally sponsored schemes (central development schemes) than states ruled by 
opposition parties. The allocation of central grants to Congress ruled states increases with a decline 
in the proportion of the state’s parliamentary seats controlled by the national ruling party.   In other 
words, central grants here intend to solidify and strengthen Congress support where it is 
comparatively weak. The arrival of coalition government at the center (analyzed here between 1996 
and 2012) generated a more complex picture because the formateur (lead party in central 
government) was required to invent ways to deal with coalition partners and outside supporters, in 
addition to the opposition parties. Even in this much more complex coalition-setting, affiliated states 
received disproportionately favorable grant allocations overall. However, the formateur party 
channeled more funds for flagship programs to non-affiliated states, to draw the attention of state 
voters to the central government’s initiatives. By managing the flagship programs well, the central 
government attempted to boost the image of the Prime Minister’s party in these states, while 
containing the rising influence of regional leaders and state parties.  
 Many of the discretionary grants which Kumar Sharma discusses in his analysis would have 
been routed through the Planning Commission. A para-constitutional body, the Planning Commission 
was set up during the Nehru administration to develop five year economic plans for the country as a 
whole and within that remit to oversee annual plans for each of the Indian states. In their contribution 
Wilfried Swenden and Rekha Saxena analyze the effect of the Planning Commission on center-state 
dynamics in post-independent India. Indian federalism, so they argue, is centralized yet also 
interdependent by design since the states implement a large set of policies in which the centre 
legislates. Yet, intergovernmental relations in India have been weakly institutionalized: the Inter-
State Council and Rajya Sabha (second chamber) have played at best a limited role in articulating 
state interests at the center. Although not designed as an intergovernmental body per se, through the 
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creation of the National Development Council, the Planning Commission was expected to give a voice 
to the states in the discussion and preparations of the five year plans and in its discretionary grant-
making activities to the states more generally. Based on document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews with some stake holders, Swenden and Saxena show that the Planning Commission 
provided little systematic input to the states and therefore by a majority of state actors was felt to 
erode their autonomy. The rise of coalition government and economic liberalization put the Planning 
Commission under pressure, and as the authors discuss led to periodical adjustments in its internal 
operation and tasks. Yet, it was the BJP majority government elected in 2014 which scrapped and 
replaced the institution with the NITI (National Institution for Transforming India) Aayog. The 
authors consider the implications of this recent institutional change for Indian federalism, more in 
particular does the NITI genuinely hold the promise of a more ‘co-operative’ let alone ‘collaborative’ 
federalism? They show that the introduction of ‘Regional Councils’ within the realm of the NITI can 
increase state involvement in strategic policy matters, but that otherwise, the NITI remains a body 
subsumed under the central government. Furthermore, they argue that the removal of considerable 
grant-making authority to the Ministry of Finance could lead to further centralization (though not 
corroborated by the current – but temporary and partial- practice of extending the Finance 
Commission grant formulae to a range of erstwhile ‘discretionary’ Planning grants), whilst an 
opportunity was missed to integrate the NITI within the Inter-State Council to put the ‘shared’ rule 
dimension of Indian federalism on a more solid institutionalized footing.    
 
 The effect of party politics on federalism is felt most intensely in those sectors of government 
which are open to direct party political influence. It follows that the implications of a paradigmatic 
change from a state-led and planned economy to a more liberalized and open economy can be more 
easily discerned in those sectors of government which have remained comparatively isolated from 
party political influence. In her contribution Indira Rajaraman seeks to do so by critically analyzing 
the continuity and change in Indian fiscal federalism. For one, the interests of states in this matter 
are not purely driven by party political interests, but reflect material concerns given their variegated 
levels of financial self-sufficiency or autonomy.  Furthermore, the bulk of central grants to the states 
in India is not discretionary in nature, but non-discretionary or statutory and allocated on the basis 
of the recommendations of the Finance Commission, an independent, temporary and expert-driven 
body appointed by the President of India. Rajaraman shows that in the short run, economic 
liberalization put disproportionate stress on the finances of the central government due to lower 
receipts from customs duty, a shortfall which it only recuperated by its aggressive use of a service 
tax levy applied to a widening universe of services, instead of what would have been a more sensitive 
replacement VAT. However, economic liberalization also enabled a gradual transformation which put 
India’s fiscal federal architecture on a stronger footing. Some of these changes constrained the central 
government and flew from recommendations of the Finance Commission: e.g. the tenth Commission 
(1995-2000) widened the remit of the divisible pool of tax revenue by incorporating all central tax 
sources, whilst the fourteenth Commission (2015-20) increased the state share of divisible tax 
revenue by ten percent. Other changes constrained both the central and state governments, e.g the 
capacity to accumulate debt and linked therewith the responsibility of the center and the states not 
to tolerate fiscal deficits of more than 3 percent of the GDP and GDSP respectively.  Although the 
center oversees levels of state-level borrowing, the process has become less discretionary after 2005, 
with enactment of fiscal responsibility legislation by the states. Borrowing and debt accumulation 
constraints follow from economic liberalization as it makes the capacity of the Indian state to raise 
money from foreign capital markets dependent on its overall credit ratings. Where such changes 
strengthen regulatory bodies at the expense of the central government (e.g. the envisaged creation 
of a Public Debt Management Agency), they can empower the Indian states, albeit in an indirect way. 
At the same time, Rajaraman demonstrates that the replacement of state VAT on goods and the 
central excise levy with a centrally levied GST (the proceeds of which will be apportioned between  
the center and the states) has been on the agenda for years. Yet, it is currently blocked as a result of 
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state opposition, either illustrating a genuine concern among (some) states for losing fiscal autonomy 
(or at best having to pool it with other states and the federal government in a GST Council), or, 
especially since the GST can only be introduced by constitutional amendment, reflecting the ability 
of federal opposition parties to mobilize states for party political ends.          
 
Policy divergence across Indian states 
  
Economic liberalization built on central deregulation and party system fragmentation are 
likely to generate centrifugal tendencies. With it comes the expectation of more policy divergence 
across the states. This special issue contains two contributions which examine this issue. In a first 
contribution Rajeshwari Deshpande, K.K. Kailash and Louise Tillin look at the role of India’s states in 
the making and implementation of social policy. They demonstrate that an initial retreat of social 
spending by the Indian government following economic liberalization has been offset by accelerated 
welfare spending as a social insurance strategy against the global financial turmoil in 2008. Higher 
economic growth under UPA I also increased financial revenue and a conscious decision was taken 
to divest a larger share of this to centrally sponsored welfare or development schemes. In India’s 
federal system, the states take responsibility for most welfare spending, while the center provides 
most of the funding (due to its prerogative in tax-raising). Under liberalization (1990-2014) state 
government expenditures on social policy have risen faster than union expenditures. With the recent 
(2015) implementation of the Fourteenth Finance Commission’s recommendations to increase the 
states’ share of the divisible pool of tax revenue by 10 percent, the scope for policy divergence in 
welfare spending is set to rise even further, despite the fact that several of the welfare schemes which 
the states adopt will continue to take the form of centrally sponsored schemes. Analyzing state policy 
divergence, Deshpande, Kailash and Tillin find commonalities and differences in the way in which 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu navigated a central health insurance scheme. Congress-ruled Kerala adopted 
the central scheme, but extended its remit beyond BPL families to lend it a character of universality 
and also adopted low insurance rates to keep the scheme largely within the public health care sector. 
On the other hand, Tamil Nadu sidelined the scheme altogether and adopted its own instead, yet like 
Kerala insisted on a prominent role of the public sector (not by touching the cost of insurance, but by 
reserving certain treatments for the public sector). This ‘universal’ approach does not mark the 
coverage of social security to workers in the informal sector as evidenced by a comparative analysis 
of Maharashtra and West Bengal. The former adopted a patronage-based approach, built on selective 
or targeted schemes for different types of informal sector workers. The West Bengal scheme, while 
more universal was also more partisan, uneven and to some extent underfunded. Deshpande, Kailash 
and Tillin argue that past legacy, political leadership and political coalitions (the latter to be 
understood as territorial policy communities bringing together social and political groups in pursuit 
of common goals) are key in understanding this inter-state policy divergence. Put differently, the 
provision of social welfare is not necessarily more advanced in those states that are economically 
most affluent (e.g. Maharashtra versus Kerala), social-democratically inclined (West Bengal versus 
Tamil Nadu) or party politically aligned with the central government of the day (Maharashtra versus 
Tamil Nadu). Legacies in the form of territorial policy communities are likely to have a stronger 
influence.   
 In a second contribution on policy divergence Andrew Wyatt focuses more squarely on the 
role of state political personalities, namely that of Chief Ministers and their international activities as 
‘chief diplomats’. Economic liberalization and party political incongruence with the center should 
have increased the foreign visibility of Chief Ministers. The former because Chief Ministers may seek 
to profile their state to attract foreign direct investment; the latter because Chief Ministers can use 
their strong party political base within their home state to criticize the federal government; even in 
a ‘reserved’ or exclusively ‘central’ competence as foreign policy. Chief Ministers can be expected to 
voice foreign policy matters if an aspect thereof touches directly upon the interests of their states. In 
this regard it may be noted that eighteen of India’s states have land borders with a foreign country 
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(excluding those states which have a less ‘tangible’ border with the international waters of the sea), 
and, given the size of the Indian diaspora, Non-Resident Indians (originating from within a state or 
union territory) have dispersed across the world. In his analysis Wyatt looks at the foreign policy 
activity of the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu. With the exception of a 
Congress Chief Minister in Kerala, all Chief Ministers analyzed represent parties with a specific state-
based following (although the CPM is a ‘national’ party, its support is concentrated within a few 
Indian states. Nonetheless, Wyatt observes strong variations in their para-diplomatic activity. CM 
Naidu (not dissimilar to Modi as CM of Gujurat) have been very active on the international scene, CM 
Chandy (Congress-Kerala) only moderately so, whereas Achuthanandan (CPM-Kerala), Karunanidhi 
(DMK-Tamil Nadu) and Jayalalithaa (AIADMK-Tamil Nadu) have hardly engaged in para-diplomacy 
Paradiplomatic engagement is fostered by the need to build up party political credentials at home 
(Naidu to silence intra-party opposition; Modi following the Godhra events) and to strengthen 
investment opportunities in a fragile state economy (especially Andhra). Conversely, in Kerala 
international engagement could thwart the pro-people and pro-poor image of a Communist leader 
and -even under Congress rule- has been confined primarily to strengthen ties with the state’s strong 
diaspora. In fact in Kerala, ‘foreign policy’ has been brought into the state administration by creating 
a ‘Non-Resident Keralites’ Affairs Department’. Wyatt attributes the near absence of para-diplomatic 
activity in Tamil Nadu to the relatively secure position of the state’s two main party leaders and its 
ability to provide land and human capital to attract FDI without aggressive promotion . Furthermore, 
both of the major Tamil parties have benefited from participating in the NDA or UPA-led coalition 
governments at the center and wielded some foreign policy influence that way (in particular with 
regard to Sri Lanka). Overall then, the differences in para-diplomatic activity among India’s Chief 
Ministers confirms the observations of Desphande, Kailash and Tillin that divergence across state 
actors cannot be explained with reference to party political incongruence in relation to the center 
alone, but is tied more strongly with factors rooted in the socio-economic context of the state and the 
dynamics of state party competition.      
 
Ethnic Conflict Management 
 
 The final two articles in this special issue focus on the contribution of Indian federalism to 
ethnic conflict management. Although they do not focus on the role of party political fragmentation 
or economic liberalization per se, the timing is appropriate for such an assessment. Since 
independence, two main ideological strands have occupied the Indian policy-space: one which 
emphasizes the nature of India as a compound and multicultural polity and does not perceive 
territorial, ethnic, religious or linguistic accommodation as a threat to India’s territorial integrity and 
nationhood; and another strand which seeks to unite the Indian state around a Hindu cultural and 
national identity. The latter strand (primarily associated with the BJP and wider Sangh Parivar today, 
but historically also present in the Congress) currently preoccupies the central government. 
Therefore, there is a potential discrepancy between the view of the BJP on federalism as an economic 
policy device and as an instrument for accommodating multi-ethnic difference. The party can 
embrace the former where it leads to economic competition and a leaner central government. More 
state autonomy can also generate policy-learning or the ‘sharing of best practices’ (and policy 
diffusion) as shown in the contribution by Deshpande, Kailash and Tillin. The strengthening of a 
majoritarian, Hindu nationalist ideology at the centre (the roots of which may be partially linked to 
the destabilizing forces of globalization and liberalization as Blom Hansen suggests15) could further 
undermine the centre’s willingness -and not just its capacity- to accommodate ethno-cultural 
differences through territorial management. Hence, the BJP is expected to be more hostile to 
                                                          
15 Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave. Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999)  
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accepting asymmetric institutional arrangements or minority ethnic accommodation more in general 
as this could dilute its Hindu (and Hindi) majoritarian view of the Indian state. The latter is even more 
pronounced today due to its hegemonic position in the central cabinet and overall parliamentary 
majority.  
 Placing India in a comparative perspective Katharine Adeney argues that India’s experience 
with territorial ethnic conflict management has been both a success and a failure. Unlike what has 
been claimed by a significant strand of the literature, India shows that ethno-federal states are 
workable, provided they take the right form. Territorial accommodation by giving ethnic minority 
groups a ‘state of their own’ can enhance their security, especially if conceded autonomy concessions 
by the center are durable (unlike in Kashmir or some of the North Eastern states for much of the last 
sixty years). Furthermore, self-rule is never enough but must be accompanied by access to central 
power. The latter has become a more prominent feature (albeit selective) in the era of central 
coalition government. However, ethno-federalism as a workable strategy, so Adeney argues, is not 
without its limits either. Sometimes state territories are too heterogeneous, ruling out a clear cut 
territorial solution. Worse still, sometimes national minorities to whom territory is conceded may 
rule their state in a majoritarian way. Just as national minorities require (constitutional) protection 
within the Indian state as a whole, so too must minorities at the state level. In fact, where non-titular 
groups become too strong, even power-sharing devices may be required, providing access to ‘state 
power’. In their contribution Harihar Bhattacharyya, Kham Khan Suan Hausing and Jhumpa 
Mukherjee precisely consider this underdeveloped ‘shared’ rule dimension and the lack of protection 
of state-based minorities in more detail. They identify this as a weak-spot of India’s ethnic 
management strategy, both in the context of linguistic state reorganization (where despite 
constitutional guarantees, the protection of state linguistic minorities is dormant), the recent 
formation of Telangana in 2014 (which reflected a lack of respect for an informal power-sharing 
agreement between the different regions and dominant ethnic groups in the state of Andhra Pradesh) 
and the increasing autonomy of Bodoland (which empowered a sub-state regional minority at the 
expense of a majority of the local population). For Bhattacharyya, Hausing and Mukherjee these three 
cases demonstrate why India has at least as much been a failure as a success of ethnic conflict 
management. In some sense, they also demonstrate the strength of majoritarianism; not only at the 
level of the Indian center, but also at that of the Indian states. For them therefore, the way in which 
power has been territorially dispersed hardly reflects and represents the multicultural reality of 
India on the ground.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
